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RESUMEN
Síntesis histórica de la política de 
importación de banano de la Unión Europea. 
Este artículo resume los principales eventos en 
el conflicto entre la Unión Europea, los países 
productores de banano de África, el Caribe y 
el Pacífico, los productores latinoamericanos, y 
Estados Unidos, relacionados con la importación 
de banano en la Unión Europea. Se discute el 
debate histórico acerca de estas políticas entre las 
partes interesadas, debate que ha llegado a cono-
cerse como “la guerra del banano”.  Describe 
eventos recientes relacionados con el proceso de 
transición de un mercado altamente protegido a 
un sistema de importación de tarifa única, el cual 
podría suavizar el conflicto pero no terminar 
con esta “guerra”.  El artículo está dividido en 
7 partes: 1) descripción de la política de impor-
tación de banano de la Unión Europea antes de 
implementar la Política Comunitaria; 2) descrip-
ción de la Política Comunitaria de Importación 
de Banano en 1993; 3) discusión de los eventos 
que se originaron después de la aprobación del 
régimen de importación de 1993; 4) descripción 
de la perspectiva de la Unión Europea sobre la 
llamada guerra del banano; 5) convenio entre los 
Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea; 6) algunos 
resultados de investigaciones relacionadas con el 
nuevo sistema de importación y 7) conclusión.
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to summarize 
the main events that have characterized the 
conflict among the European Union, African, 
Caribbean and Pacific producers, Latin American 
exporters, and the United States, regarding 
banana imports into the EU. The article provides 
a discussion of the historical debate over these 
policies by stakeholders, a debate which has 
come to be known as “the banana war.”  This 
article also shows that current events regarding 
the transition from a highly protected banana 
market in the EU to a tariff-only import system, 
which may lessen the skirmishing, but will 
not entirely put an end to this “war.”  There is 
such a variety of divergent concerns at play, 
as the debate over the last decade has shown, 
that fulfilling everybody’s interests will prove 
impossible. The paper is divided into seven 
sections as follows: 1) description of the EU 
policy structure prior to the establishment of 
the Common Market Organization for Bananas; 
2) description of the 1993 Common Market 
Organization for Bananas; 3) discussion of the 
events that followed the 1993 import regime; 
4) description of the EU perspective on the so-
called banana war; 5) agreement between the EU 
and the US; 6) some research findings related to 
the new import system and 7) conclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
The economic importance of the European 
Union’s (EU’s) banana market is evident in the 
history of trade disputes that have enveloped it 
for years. There is such a diversity of concerns 
at play that satisfying everybody’s interests has 
been a nearly impossible task not only for the 
EU, but for the United States (US), Latin America 
exporters, banana producers in former European 
colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific 
(ACP), as well as the involvement of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Even among the 
same interest groups there is often disagreement 
on the way import restrictions on this market 
should be administered. Consider, for example 
one of the most current cases, Latin American 
producers who stand to gain the most from an 
open market. While Costa Rica advocates for a 
gradual elimination of the current import tariff 
to avoid an immediate overflow of the European 
market that would excessively decrease export 
prices, its neighbors believe that immediate 
deregulation of Europe is the sensible course of 
action. 
The purpose of this article is to summarize 
the main events that have characterized the 
conflict among the European Union, Latin 
American countries, African, Caribbean and 
Pacific nations and the United States regarding 
banana imports into the EU. The subject is of high 
importance given the new import system adopted 
by the EU in January of 2006. This new import 
regime replaces the previous import system 
whereby the EU banana market was regulated 
by a complicated combination of tariffs and 
quotas on non-preferred suppliers. The article 
is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the 
EU policy structure prior to the establishment of 
the Common Market Organization for Bananas 
(CMOB) in 1993. Section 2 describes the CMOB 
as it was originally conceived. Section 3 discuses 
the various trade disputes held between 1993 
and 2002 related to the import regime brought 
by the CMOB. Section 4 describes the most 
common justifications of the CMOB given by 
the EU. Finally, section 5 details the agreement 
reached between the EU and the US in 2002 and 
the transition to the tariff-only import regime 
that came into effect in January of 2006. Section 
6 concludes.
EU IMPORT POLICY PRIOR TO 1993
The EU is primarily a customs union and as 
such each member nation must abide by a common 
set of import and export policies. Prior to 1993 
however, bananas were exempt from the union.
The 1993 policy to bring bananas under 
a unified tariff structure essentially lead to an 
amalgamation of the variety of prior banana 
import policies prevalent in member countries, 
thus in order to understand how the current 
regime exists, it is necessary to understand from 
whence it came. 
Prior to 1993, there were 3 general 
agreements that ruled the European banana 
market: i) a common external tariff of 20% 
applied to non-preferred suppliers; ii) the Lomé 
Convention,1 that gave preferential treatment 
to the banana imports from former European 
colonies; and, iii) the Treaty of Rome2 that 
allowed France, Italy and the United Kingdom to 
protect their preferred suppliers. Additionally, a 1 The Lomé Convention actually refers to accords from 4 different conventions of that name between the EU 
and 71 countries from Africa, the Caribbean, and 
Pacific. The first accord was signed in February of 
1975. It gives to these countries trade preferences for 
a group of commodities. Protocol number 5 of the 
Convention deals with the banana trade. It states that 
no ACP country will be made worse off in terms of its 
access to traditional markets and its preferred states. 
Specifically, this protocol allows ACP countries to 
export duty free bananas to the EU.
2 The Banana Protocol of the Treaty of Rome (March 
1957) allowed the then European Community to 
concede permits to its member states to restrict 
banana imports from other nations. The protocol 
states 2 requirements for such a restriction: i) the 
good must be produced in the other nation and; 
ii) the restriction must safeguard any quotas the 
interested nation has.
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special protocol of the Treaty of Rome permitted 
Germany to import duty-free bananas from 
any country (IICA 1995). In addition to these 
stipulations, each country was allowed to define 
its own banana import policy. This explains 
the wide variety of import regimes among the 
EU prior the definition of the Common Market 
Organization. 
From the various policies it is useful 
to define 3 categories of importing European 
nations within the policies. The first group 
includes the mostly closed markets that protected 
their traditional suppliers from the ACP region 
over non-preferred producers, mainly from Latin 
America (Table 1). This group comprises Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, France and the United Kingdom. 
These countries conferred preferential treatment 
to other favored nations and granted a minimum 
price for their bananas. Additionally, they 
imposed a quota in order to limit imports from 
third countries (Borrell and Maw-Cheng 1992). 
The second group comprises those countries that 
applied a 20% common tariff on non-preferred 
suppliers with the objective of protecting the 
ACP countries. The third category is made up of 
Germany, Austria, Sweden and Finland (Austria, 
Finland and Sweden were not part of the EU 
at this time). These nations advocated for free 
trade and gave boundless access to their market 
to all suppliers. For a summary of the prevalent 
national policies before 1993, see table 2. 
France constituted one of the most protective 
markets. In general, France reserved around 
2/3 of its market for its overseas departments 
(Martinique and Guadeloupe) and much of the 
rest for French speaking African countries, mainly 
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoir, and Madagascar (IICA 
1995). It is estimated that in 1985-1987, about 
94% of the French market was reserved for its 
overseas territories and former colonies (Borrell 
et al. 1992). Imports from third countries were 
licensed and allowed only when import prices 
Table 1.  EU banana exporter categories prior to 1993.
Preferred suppliers Non-preferred suppliers
African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACPs) countries EU overseas territories
Latin American producers 
and others Non-traditional ACP
Belize (a) Crete Brazil Belize (b)
Cameroon (a) Guadeloupe Colombia Cameroon (b)
Cape Verde Martinique Costa Rica Dominican Republic
Dominica Madeira Ecuador Ghana
Grenada The Canary Islands Guatemala Ivory Coast (b)
Ivory Coast (a) Honduras Other ACP
Jamaica Mexico
Madagascar Nicaragua
Saint Lucia Panama
Saint Vincent Philippines
Somalia Others no identified
Suriname
Windward Islands
Sources: Borrell (1994); Patiño and Andrea (2000).
(a) Traditional quantities. (b) Above traditional preferred quantities.
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reached a minimum level. Latin American imports 
were limited to an annual 270 000 t and were 
additionally taxed with the 20% common tariff. 
The United Kingdom granted free access 
to Commonwealth producers such as Jamaica, 
Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, 
Suriname and Belize. Imports from other 
countries were subject to a licensing system 
and were only allowed when there existed a 
shortage in the favored supply. Additionally, the 
20% common import tariff was applied to these 
imports. After 1989, a licensed minimum level 
of 30000 t was established for Latin American 
producers. Borrell et al. (1992) estimated that 3 
quarters of the market was granted to preferred 
suppliers.
Italy allowed free access to imports from 
European Community territories and ACP countries, 
Somalia being its traditional supplier. A 270 000 t 
quota was established to limit imports from other 
nations in 1983. This regulation remained in place 
until the approval of the 1993 import regime.
Portugal and Spain restricted their banana 
imports to protect their own producers; Madeira 
in the case of Portugal and the Canary Islands in 
the case of Spain. Both markets were closed to 
Latin American bananas other than in exceptional 
circumstances. Greece also limited access to its 
Table 2.  Restriction on non-preferred suppliers prior the establishment of the Common Market Organization for Bananas.
Group 1 (Wanted to  protect former colonies)
Country Tariff Quota Other restrictions 
France 20% 270 000 t Mostly closed to third countries’ exports. 
United Kingdom 20% 30 000 t Licensed and allowed only when there existed a shortage in the favored supply.
Italy None 270 000 t None
Portugal and Spain None None
Group 2 (Wanted to protect ACP countries under the Lomé Convention)
Country Tariff Quota Other restrictions 
Denmark 20% None None
Ireland 20% None None
Netherlands 20% None None
Belgium 20% None None
Luxemburg 20% None None
Group 3 (Advocated for free trade)
Country Tariff Quota Other restrictions 
Germany No None None
Austria (1) No None None
Finland (1) No None None
Sweden (1) No None None
(1)  Countries not part of the EU when the CMOB came into effect.
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market in order to protect its domestic production 
setting a prohibitive import tax on bananas from 
other regions (Borrell et al. 1992). 
Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium 
and Luxemburg granted free market privileges 
to the traditional ACP suppliers. Although these 
countries did not have overseas banana producing 
territories, the benefits they conceded to the ACP 
nations were those regulated under the Lomé 
Convention. 
The consequences of the EU policy 
structure, compared to a situation with free access 
for all producers, were reductions in overall 
banana imports, lower world prices but increased 
prices for EU consumers and preferred producers. 
As a result, preferential exporters’ production 
increased, exacerbating the problems related to 
lower world prices in other regions, particularly 
Latin America. Further, the way in which the 
EU import licenses were written generated rent 
seeking behavior on the part of banana importers 
(Borrell 1997).
Import restrictions have been calculated 
to cost European consumers $1.6 billion a year. 
To put this number in perspective, despite the 
fact that one justification of the import program 
was foreign aid, only $300 million actually went 
back to ACP producers, the remainder going to 
government revenue or lost surplus. Additionally, 
it cost $100 million a year to other developing 
countries due to the lost export opportunities 
(Borrell 1997). 
The cost for society has not been 
calculated on a world scale. Clearly, however, the 
incentives encouraged less efficient producers to 
use resources in the production of bananas and 
reduced production more efficient regions (It 
has been estimated that a t of bananas produced 
in Latin America cost on average $162, whereas 
the production cost of bananas produced in 
the EU’s preferred nations reached $500 t-1 
(Cascavel 1998)). Removing the pre-1993 EU 
policy structure would have led to welfare gains 
for the global economy (Borrell 1997).
THE COMMON MARKET 
ORgANIzATION FOR BANANAS
The EU Common Market Organization 
for Bananas represented the consolidation of 
various efforts to regulate the market. The first 
attempt was in the mid seventies, when the 
main Latin American exporters argued for the 
necessity of organizing the market in order to 
overcome overproduction and low world prices. 
Although the implementation of a Common 
Market was seen as a reinforcement of a customs 
union doctrine (WTO 1997), its main goal was 
to balance opposing interests of diverse groups 
affected by the hodgepodge of national-level 
import policies. With the implementation of the 
1993 Agreement, free intra-EU movement of 
bananas was allowed, and the EU took a position 
of reaching 3 main importer-nation objectives 
(Patiño and Andrea 2000):
1. To assure overseas territories would get 
higher prices to compensate for their 
higher production costs.
2. To fulfill the commitments with ACP 
countries made through the Lomé 
Convention. 
3. To ensure consumers an adequate supply 
of high-quality bananas from third-party 
countries (Borrell 1997). 
Since prior to 1993, Latin American 
bananas represented 99.36% of non-preferred 
production, all the rules directed at “third-party” 
nations refer essentially to Latin American or 
“dollar bananas” (Zúñiga 1993).3
3 Since a large portion of the Latin American banana 
exports are dominated by US-headquartered 
companies, bananas from Latin America are also 
called dollar bananas.
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During the Uruguay Round negotiations, 
Switzerland, Japan, Finland, Korea and New 
Zealand offered to liberalize their banana markets. 
In opposition to these initiatives, the European 
Union decided not to include the banana trade 
in its negotiations. This position was evident 
with the ratification of the 1993 regulation, 
which further restricted the EU banana market. 
However, this new regime was not compatible 
with WTO’s “most favored nation” clause since 
it conceded trade preferences to ACP nations 
(IICA 1995).4
The 1993 Agreement defined a specific set 
of importing guidelines for overseas territories 
and for how ACP and non-preferred suppliers 
would be allowed to export. A quota for each 
supplier category was set. Overseas territory and 
ACP exports were duty free up to the amount 
specified by the quota. An initial tariff of ECU 
100 t-1 was imposed on intra quota imports for 
third party suppliers (mainly Latin America). The 
regime also allowed free movement of bananas 
among the European Union.
To protect production in overseas territories 
and ensure producers from those regions a 
minimum income, exports up to a maximum of 
854 000 t were eligible for deficiency payments 
(These payments were made by the EU). The 
payment was defined as the difference between 
the market price and a reference price determined 
by the EU. Exports over these quantities were not 
covered by the compensation system. To guarantee 
that all countries benefited, a maximum import 
amount subject to compensation was assigned 
to each one. This maximum level was allocated 
based on the historical quantities exported by 
each country. However, the limits imposed were 
greater than the 1991 export amount (Table 3). 
Communitarian suppliers were also eligible for 
additional compensatory assistance. Producers 
who had to abandon banana production were 
subject to an indemnity. To qualify, they had to 
either cease all production if their plantation is 
less than 5 ha or at least 50% if it was greater than 
8 ha (Zúñiga 1993). 
ACP countries were split into 2 groups: 
traditional and non-traditional suppliers. ACP 
traditional imports consisted of bananas exported 
by ACP countries in annual historic quantities. 
The non-traditional category incorporated 
imports from traditional ACP suppliers over 
the quantities habitually exported and imports 
from other ACP countries that did not produce 
bananas prior to 1993. Exports from this group 
4 Most favored nation guarantees WTO country members 
they will get the same commercial treatment from their 
Table 3.  Overseas territories’ production subject to price compensation.
Overseas territory Maximum production subject to compensation 1991 production Excess (%)
Canary Islands 420 000 339 450 23.73
Guadeloupe 150 000 116 124 29.17
Martinique 219 000 181 069 20.94
Madeira 50 000 N.A N.A
Crete 15 000 N.A N.A
Total 854 000 636 643 24.00
Source: Patiño and Andrea (2000).
trade partners as any other nation (http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Most_favored_nation_clause 2006).
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were treated as if they were from non-preferred 
suppliers and taxed at €750 t-1. Traditional ACP 
exporters enjoyed duty-free access up to 857 
700 t as well as any other quantity imported 
when unfilled quotas occurred from the non-
preferred suppliers. The quota was split among 
the countries according to the traditional amount 
exported for each (Table 4). 
This treatment of over-quota exports was 
the only modification traditional ACP exporters 
faced relative to their situation prior to 1993. 
Under the Lomé Convention Agreement, 
traditional ACP countries were not restricted 
at all in their duty-free imports. However, with 
the exception of Cameroon, the quotas imposed 
on each country did not limit their exports. As 
shown in table 4, nearly all of the export levels 
of the ACP countries were below the maximum 
duty-free quantities allowed from 1994 to 2000. 
One exception was Cameroon, whose banana 
exports were greater than the duty-free quota in 
1999 and 2000. 
For non-preferred exporters, the Common 
Market Organization introduced an aggregate 
tariff-quota of 2 million t with a €100 t-1 tariff 
(roughly equivalent to a 20% ad-valorem tax). 
Over-quota imports were subject to a levy of €850 
t-1 (comparable to a 170% ad-valorem taxation, 
Zúñiga 1993). Further, the quota was subject to 
change depending on the projected market situation 
each year as a function of predicted European 
consumption and preferred supplier’s production 
only. Changes in Latin American production were 
not considered and Latin America was the only 
region whose allocation was smaller than the 
quantities it exported to the EU prior 1993. Notice 
for example in table 5 that Latin America exported 
to the EU on average more than 2.7 million 
Table 4.  Duty free import quantity limits for ACP suppliers and export levels in the period 1994-2000 (3)
Country Duty free quota
Actual imports
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Cote d’Ivoire (2) 155 000 - - 13 684 122 045 114 664 141 924 140 916
Cameroon 155 000 148 921 113 121 109 978 170 734 191 925
Suriname(2) 38 000 27 861 33 438 22 227 24 162 17 853 28 467 28 064
Somalia (2) 60 000 - - 13 540 13 457 4 551 0 0
Jamaica (2) 105 000 75 595 82 832 66 858 67 999 55 588 41 428 30 973
Saint Lucia (2) 127 000 - - 79 877 52 602 56 861 53 579 47 692
Saint Vincent/ 
Grenadine 82 000 - -
Dominica (2) 71 000 - - 27 260 27 053 22 543 22 755 18 058
Belize (1) (2) 40 000 - 34 409 35 027 27 613 36 979 37 826
Cape Verde 4 800
Grenada 14 000 4 504 4 695 1 451 59 47 501 507
Madagascar 5 900 - - - -
Total 857 700 107 960 120 965 408 227 455 525 409 698 496 367 495 961
Source: CORBANA (1993) and United Nations Statistics.
(1) Only a portion of Belize’s exports enjoys preferential treatment in the EU.
(2) Exports estimated from banana imports reported by the EU.
(3) t (Tons)
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t year-1 during 1980-1999. The quota of 2 million 
t represented about 72% of the annual average 
exports by this region to the EU.
The new regime also created an import 
licensing system to distribute the non-preferred 
quota among importers. The allowance was 
split into 3 categories of operators on the basis 
of historical quantities imported. Category A 
comprised traditional banana importers from 
Latin America who were allowed to import 
66.5% of the 2 million t quota. Category B 
consisted of operators who traditionally imported 
bananas from preferred suppliers. They were 
authorized to import 30% of the quota assigned 
to Latin American producers. A category C 
was created to reserve import rights for new 
importers established in 1992. These received 
the last 3.5% of the import quota assigned to 
Latin American exporters. 
Transference of import licenses was allowed 
between importers in the same category and 
among importers of categories A and B. It was not 
permissible to transfer licenses from or to category 
C. However, the principles that ruled the license 
transference were different for each category and 
harmed Latin American operators. For instance, if 
an importer of category A sold its import license to 
a category-B operator, the seller lost its license for 
the next period. However, if the transaction was in 
the opposite direction, from category B to A, this 
rule did not hold and the B operator was able to 
make use of its license the next period.
CMOB RELATED EVENTS AFTER 1993
The European policy has been extremely 
controversial since its creation in 1993. It faced 
numerous obstacles with most of the involved 
parties in the market, leading in most cases, to 
modifications of the original policy. 
Although the Latin American countries, as 
a region, do not enjoy the same economic power 
as the European Union, they have been proactive 
with regard to modifications to the 1993 import 
system leading to 3 of the major adjustments. The 
United States, because of its economic interests 
in the region, also had an important role in the 
so-called banana war challenging the EU import 
regime several times.
Table 5.  Exports of main Latin American banana producers (1980-1999) (1).
Country Total exports Exports to the EU Share of imports to the EU Share into EU total imports
Colombia 10 719.1 4 290.4 40.03 15.5
Costa Rica 13 034.4 5 730.7 43.97 20.7
Ecuador 17 567.3 3 931.9 22.38 14.2
Guatemala 4 025.6 497.1 12.35 1.8
Honduras 9 953.9 2 162.9 21.73 7.8
Nicaragua 845.0 259.0 30.65 0.9
Mexico 778.0 0.0 0.00 0.0
Panama 7 766.8 4 701.2 60.53 17.0
Dominican Republic 70.6 8.5 12.04 0.0
Total Latin America 71 951.6 27 734.4 38.55 100.0
(1) 100 t.
Source: United Nations. Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe. Tendencias y Perspectivas de las Exportaciones 
de Banano de América Latina y El Caribe. 1993
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For exposition purposes, adjustments to the 
banana import policy are split into 2 chronological 
periods. The first covers changes that occurred 
between 1993 and the 1999 WTO declaration that 
the European import system was illegal. During 
this period, the 1993 regime was only marginally 
modified. The second period covers changes after 
the WTO declaration in 1999 through 2001. The 
last WTO resolution urged the EU to modify its 
policy. In this sub-section, the failed attempts to 
define a new import policy to please everybody 
are presented. It also describes the background 
for the EU-US 2001 agreement.
The first adjustment to the regime was 
made in 1994 when Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Venezuela and Nicaragua reached an agreement 
with the EU in the context of the Uruguay Round 
Negotiations (GATT). On this occasion, the quota 
for Latin America was raised to 2.1 million t. 
Then in 1995, with the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, at the request of 
Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador and Panama, 
the quota was increased to 2.2 million t and 
the within-quota tariff was reduced from 
100 ECU to 75 ECU t-1. Additionally, these 
countries negotiated a fixed participation in the 
quota applied to the Latin American exporters. 
Costa Rica and Colombia obtained the greater 
portion with 23.4% and 21% of the global quota, 
respectively. Nicaragua got 3% and Venezuela 
2% of the allowance. The parties were allowed 
to trade the import rights among themselves. 
However, the agreement was canceled in 1998, 
when Germany and Belgium requested an inquiry 
by the Justice Tribunal of the EU. The quota 
allocation was considered illegal, since the export 
rights discriminated among exporters.
An additional modification of the quota 
to Latin American exporters was introduced in 
1995. A temporary tariff quota of 353 000 t was 
added when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined 
the European Union. Nonetheless, the increase 
in quota was not large enough to match the 
total banana import levels these countries had 
prior to their entering to the European Union. 
As shown in table 6, total imports of this group 
during the period 1990-1994 were greater than 
the additional Latin American quota approved. 
Indeed, the growth tendency shown by these 
countries’ imports stopped once they joined 
the European Union. The additional allowance 
applied until 1997, when the third-countries’ 
quota was set back to 2 200 000 t. 
It is interesting that the EU banana regime 
not only caused difficulties between the EU and 
the affected parties, but also divided the Latin 
American block. As a consequence of the quota 
allocation agreement negotiated by some nations, 
the Latin American unit split into 2 groups. One 
composed those countries that accepted the new 
import regime: Costa Rica, Venezuela, Nicaragua 
and Colombia. The other comprised nations that 
advocated for an alternative system: Ecuador, 
Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and Panama. 
Table 6.  Austria, Finland and Sweden banana imports for the period 1990-2000 (1).
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Austria 144 154 150 146 144 111 96 94 88 102 93
Finland 70 73 86 96 169 66 58 60 58 64 62
Sweden 143 160 162 153 154 147 149 159 175 185 187
Total 357 387 398 395 466 324 303 313 321 351 341
Difference respect to the quota -4 -34 -45 -42 -113 29 50 40 32 2 12
(1) 100 t.
Source: FAO Statistics
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The US supported the latter group 
claiming that its firms were harmed by the EU 
import regime. In fact, the US-headquartered, 
multinational firms felt more threatened when 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela 
negotiated their allocations. The US firms argued 
that their economic interest would be harmed if 
the national quotas were executed because most 
of their production was not allocated in those 
countries. 
Because of this discontent, the US 
government started an investigation process to 
determine if the actions taken by those countries 
truly harmed the US firms’ interests. The US 
threatened to impose economic sanctions on the 
nations that accepted the import regime if the 
harm to its companies were proved. As a result, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela resigned the agreement 
and did not execute the allocated quotas assigned 
to them. On the other hand, Colombia and Costa 
Rica ratified the agreement. 
The US government threatened Costa Rica 
and Colombia with the suspension of commercial 
benefits these countries enjoy as part of the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) (The CBI is 
a unilateral preferential treatment between the 
US and countries from the Caribbean Area. 
It allows duty-free entrance to exports to the 
US and its territories). Finally, the US favored 
Costa Rica and Colombia’s position. The US 
government understood these countries acted in 
defense of their interest, considering the high 
dependence of these countries’ economies to the 
banana activity.
In 1997, the US, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Mexico requested a hearing of the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade 
Organizations against the EU (Ecuador and 
Panama supported the action but did not take part 
since they were not WTO members at that time). 
This group argued that the EU’s import policy 
harmed their interests and favored ACP suppliers. 
On this occasion, the WTO’s resolution 
partially favored the EU. The DSB determined 
that, although based on the terms of the Lomé 
Convention, the EU was right to concede 
preferences to the ACP nations, some aspects of the 
new import system were found to be in opposition 
to WTO rules, specifically, the Agreement on 
Import and Licenses Procedures, and the General 
Agreement on Trade and Services. The WTO 
affirmed that the CMOB unfairly discriminated 
against some importing and marketing firms in 
Latin America. As a result, the EU adopted a 
modified set of import policies that entered into 
force in January 1999. Three principal changes 
were introduced:
a) The 4 “substantial suppliers” of the EU 
(Ecuador, Costa Rica, Colombia and 
Panama) were allocated specific shares of 
tariff-quotas A and B on the basis of the 
1994-1996 period.
b) The country-specific, sub-quotas within 
the quota for countries of Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific were abolished. 
c) The complex system of import license 
allocation was simplified by reducing the 
number of market operator types from 7 to 
2 (traditional and newcomer operators).
These adjustments came in the context of 
a greater liberalization of the EU’s agricultural 
sector and its commitment to the WTO. The 
adapted import system safeguarded the obligation 
the EU had with the traditional ACP suppliers 
and, at the same time, it met the responsibilities 
the EU had acquired with the WTO.
In 1999, Ecuador and the US confronted 
the European policy again and brought another 
demand to the WTO. These countries were not 
pleased with the modifications enforced in 1999 
by the EU. This time, the case was resolved in 
favor of Ecuador and the US. The resolution 
imposed an important precedent in the WTO 
since it was the first time a developing country 
was authorized to execute economic sanctions on 
a developed block. The US was also authorized 
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to impose economic sanction on the EU.5 
Additionally, the EU was asked to make further 
changes to its banana import regime in order to 
make it compatible with WTO specifications. 
After the WTO declared the European 
banana import system illegal in 2000, the 
European Union Commission started a 
consultation process with the involved parties. 
Its goal was to define a new WTO compatible 
policy generally accepted by the parties. By the 
end of 1999, the Commission proposed a “tariff 
only” system that would be introduced in 2006. 
Meanwhile, it suggested adopting a transitional 
tariff quota system with preferential access 
for ACP producers. The proposal suggested 
maintaining type A and B quotas during the 
transition period, namely, maintaining the EU’s 
2.2 million t charged with a €75 t-1 tariff. The 
type-B quota would be autonomous and for an 
amount of 353 000 t for which the €75 t-1 tariff 
would also apply. Additionally, the EU considered 
the creation of a new autonomous quota (type C) 
of 850 000 t. ACP exports would continue to 
enter duty free under any quota category. 
None of the parties expressed any kind 
of disagreement with this component of the 
proposal. The conflict with the parties started 
when the Commission communicated its intention 
of conceding import licenses on a historical basis. 
A new period of consultation started. 
After 7 months of discussion, the 
Commission announced a new import license 
distribution system. It was based on its initial 
proposal of license concessions based on a 
historical reference period but also considered 
a proposal made by the Caribbean countries and 
redefined the operators that would have access to 
the quotas. 
The proposal was not accepted by the 
US operators nor by some Latin American 
producers. The US held its opposition even 
though the Commission estimated that US 
operators would fall into the new definition and 
therefore would increase their market share. A 
new dialogue process started with the objective 
of reaching an agreement about the historical 
reference period for the license allocation. 
Once again, the process did not yield any 
agreement between the parties (Commission of 
the European Communities 2000).
At this point, the Commission initiated 
an evaluation of a quota system based on 
a “first come, first served” system. It was 
considered the last option to define an import 
policy compatible with the WTO rules and 
that would please the involved parties. The 
EU recognized many advantages in the “first 
come, first served” system. First, it was a WTO 
compatible import structure. In fact, the WTO 
defined it as a good system for the management 
of tariff quotas in its resolution of the Ecuador 
panel in 1999. Specifically, it represented the 
solution to the quota management problem for 
it would imply the elimination of national quota 
allocations and definition of operators. The 
distinction between traditional and newcomer 
operators would disappear. In addition, the rent 
shifting originated by the trade in license would 
be overcome (Commission of the European 
Communities 2000).
However, there were some weaknesses 
attached to the system that required an adequate 
solution by the EU. For example, the perishable 
character of bananas requires the period between 
transportation from the production center and the 
arrival of the fruit to be limited. The proposed 
system could delay the process. There was also 
the possibility of technical difficulties in the 
ports because increased shipments may create 
congestion. Additionally, there were also budgetary 
implications for the EU. Under a “first come, first 
served” system, the banana supply would increase 
in the market driving the price down but, perhaps, 
more importantly, raising the compensatory 
5 The US increased by 100% the import tariff on 
European textiles, cheese, jam and cookies. The 
sanctions affected all Communitarian countries but 
Netherlands and Denmark. The US government 
claimed this tax would compensate for the estimated 
$520 million losses US firms have had as a result of 
the EU import banana policy (La Nación 1999).
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payments to European producers (Commission of 
the European Communities 2000).
Not surprisingly, each party claimed 
some kind of modification to the proposal that 
would fit their interests. Some of them even 
advocated for a different system. For example, 
most exporters favored an import regime based 
on historical references. Their main argument 
was that the proposed system would reinforce 
the large operators’ position to the detriment of 
the small and medium sized ones. They claimed 
that the larger exporters were more capable of 
negotiating shipping arrangements (Commission 
of the European Communities 2000).
European community producers were 
indifferent to the system since the compensatory 
payments would have covered any decrease in 
their income. On the contrary, ACP producers 
favored the maintenance of the quota system as 
long as possible. However, even though the new 
system did not perfectly fit their interests, the 
foreseen increase in the tariff preference in one 
of the quotas was to their benefit (Commission of 
the European Communities 2000).
The system never came into effect however, 
primarily because of US opposition. At this point 
the EU started the bilateral negotiations with the 
US that brought the EU-US agreement in 2001 
discussed in the next section. But, before moving 
on to this, it is important to mention the CMOB’s 
estimated economic impacts.
The 1993 policy resulted in higher priced 
bananas for most EU consumers. Many studies 
have been conducted since the introduction of 
this policy to quantify its effects on European 
countries’ welfare.6 All of them agree that German 
consumers were the most affected by the CMOB 
due to a lower supply of bananas in this market 
and its consequent increase in prices. Recall, 
Germany initially had no restrictions on imports. 
After the 1993 regime, exports to Germany 
were estimated to decrease by 250 000 t year-1 
compared to a free market situation. German 
consumers’ welfare losses were calculated at $50 
million year-1 (Kersten 1995). On the other hand, 
consumers in countries that had restrictive import 
policies, such as France and UK, were made 
better off. In those countries, real import prices 
of bananas decreased with the introduction of 
the new regime. A similar situation occurred in 
Spain, Portugal, and Greece (Kox 1998). 
However, despite the gains for some countries, 
total consumer welfare decreased in the European 
market. Consumers’ losses for the EU (excluding 
Germany) were calculated at approximately $640 
million compared to the market situation that 
prevailed before 1993 (Kersten 1995, Borrell 1997). 
This estimation corresponds solely to consumers’ 
losses due to the CMOB. As mentioned in Section 
1, Borrell estimated that policies prevalent prior to 
1993, cost consumers $1.6 billion a year.
Additionally, the goal of protecting 
developing countries was inefficiently, and only 
partially, reached. The 1993 regime imposed 
costly resource transfers from one group of 
underdeveloped nations to another. It is estimated 
that Latin American nations incurred a cost of 
$0.32 ($98 million a year) for every dollar of 
aid reaching preferred suppliers (Kersten 1995, 
Borrell 1997).
EU PERSPECTIVE ON THE CMOB 
AND THE BANANA WAR
In addition to the point of view of the third 
parties affected by the EU banana import policy, it 
is important to consider the European perception 
6 Welfare is an economic measure of well-being that 
takes into account theory-based measures of the dif-
ference between what consumers would pay and what 
producers would accept for the product and the actual 
price in the market. The calculations thus take into 
account consumers, producers as well as the govern-
ment sector and researchers strive to measure the differ-
ence between the welfare that exists under a particular 
regime and that which might exist if, say, the quotas and 
tariffs were abolished. Interested readers are referred to 
Alston, Norton and Pardey for a discussion of different 
economic methods used to measure these changes.
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and justification of its own banana regime. One 
of the main justifications given by the EU is 
the need to fulfill the requirements established 
by the European Single Market (ESM). This 
policy intended to increase welfare within the 
EU through a higher level of competition and 
efficiency. Therefore, defenders of the CMOB 
argue that this policy had a justifiable goal: to 
benefit domestic producers and consumers of 
bananas within the EU’s borders. Defenders 
argue that there is sufficient proof that the 
European Single Market was indeed successful at 
enhancing global welfare when considering the 
policy as a whole (Allen et al. 1998). Therefore, 
one could argue that the CMOB is an exception to 
the success the more global policy had.
As a second goal, the policy was meant to 
protect the economies of the ACP nations. These 
countries are alleged to be highly dependent on 
the banana sector and any sudden adjustment 
in their productive structure would have had 
devastating social consequences.7 The nobility of 
this argument breaks down however, when one 
considers developing nations outside the ACP. 
As discussed earlier, the 1993 regime imposed 
extremely high costs for Latin American countries, 
also developing nations, thus the transfer of surplus 
is arguably from one developing region to another. 
Based on their Human Development index many 
ACP nations are considered among, so called, 
medium developed nations (Cameroon and Cote 
d’Ivoir are the exceptions). By comparison, most 
of the Latin American countries are doing very 
poorly based on the same index (Table 7).
Evaluating dependency on the sector, a 
study performed by Kox in 1998 found that 
banana exports to the EU represent only 3-
7% of total export earnings for the poorest 
ACP countries. Meanwhile, banana exports’ 
contribution to domestic income in Honduras, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador and Panama is 3-8 times 
more than in most ACP countries.
In addition to the economic justification of 
the CMOB, there are also political reasons that 
made the EU‘s adopted systems preferable to a free-
trade alternative. One of the stronger arguments 
is that under free trade, the EU would have felt 
political pressure to make direct payments to the 
communitarian and ACP producers of their former 
colonies. This would have been a hefty expense. 
Even if the EU had had the budget, Tangermann 
(1997) argues that none of the benefited parties felt 
comfortable with the idea of resources provided 
in such a fashion. Additionally, both the EU 
and the ACP nations worried about the social 
consequences that adjustment to their productive 
structure would have.
Perhaps the biggest argument used by the 
CMOB defenders is that this policy was not as 
costly as has been estimated. Most studies make 
their welfare estimations based on the situation 
prevalent in 1991 and 1992 (Borrell). However, 
this period is arguably unrepresentative of the real 
tendency in the market because the Latin American 
exporters increased their shipments forecasting 
a change in the policy (Tangermann 1997). 
Nevertheless, defenders of this argument left an 
important question unanswered: how were the Latin 
American exporters able to increase their shipments 
if most of the European market was protected under 
the multi-policy situation prior to 1993? 
AgREEMENT BETWEEN THE US 
AND THE EU
After 8 years of controversy (1993-2000), 
the EU negotiated with the US a settlement that 
would put an end to the CMOB. It also involved, 
in addition to the US, most traditional nations 
implicated in the banana dispute. Both the 
United States and the European Union agreed 
to modify their commercial policy related to the 
banana dispute. 
The agreement was conceived in 2 stages. 
The first phase came into effect in July 2001. 
7 For example, 70% of Saint Vincent’s revenue depends 
directly and indirectly on the banana sector. One of 
every 3 people in Saint Lucia depends on this activity. 
Additionally, 60% of the revenue received by the 4 EU 
overseas territories comes from banana production.
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It established a temporary elimination of the 
100% ad valorem tariff the US had imposed 
on imports of certain European goods. This 
tariff was applied by the US as a sanction on 
the EU for the banana dispute held with the 
Latin American countries. Additionally, the US 
agreed to drop its hold to the Lomé Convention, 
allowing the waiver to Article I of the GATT to 
pass (This waiver allowed the EU to continue 
giving preferential treatment to ACP countries). 
The European Union agreed to allocate 2 more 
100 000 t quotas for Latin American bananas and 
to eliminate a third quota for the ACP countries. 
The distribution of quotas was based on historical 
Table 7.  Human Development Index (HDI) of the EU banana suppliers (a).
Country Region Human development index Rank (1999) GDP per capita ($US) 1
Dominica* ACP 0.873 - 3778
Grenada * ACP 0.843 - 3295
Saint Lucia * ACP 0.838 - 4505
Saint Vincent and the 
Granadillas (a) ACP 0.836 - 3018
Costa Rica LA 0.821 41 2942
Mexico LA  0.790 51 5036
Panama LA  0.784 52 3397
Belize ACP  0.776 54 3045
Colombia LA  0.765 62 2093
Suriname ACP  0.758 64 1657
Brazil LA  0.750 69 3525
Philippines Others  0.749 70 1032
Jamaica ACP  0.738 78 1487
Ecuador LA 0.726 84 1109
Cape Verde ACP 0.708 91 1400
El Salvador LA 0.701 95 2007
Nicaragua LA 0.635 106 459
Honduras LA 0.634 107 856
Guatemala LA 0.626 108 1637
Madagascar ACP 0.462 135 239
Ivory Coast ACP 0.426 144 808
Source: Human Development Reports. 1999
(a) The HDI combines the real purchasing power per capita, life expectancy at birth, education in terms of adult literacy and 
school enrollment.
* The index was not reported for these countries in 1999. The value shown corresponds to 1994.
(1) Source:  Statistics Division of the United Nations Secretiarat and International Labour Office.
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allocations of import licenses using the years 
1994-1996 as the reference period (this reference 
period was selected by the EU based on trade 
data availability).
The second stage would move toward the 
elimination of the CMOB and the adoption of a 
new import system. A difference of this phase 
with respect to the first stage of the agreement 
was that it did not have a definitive schedule for 
its implementation although it had to enter into 
force not later than January 2006 (Guyomard 
and Le Mouël 2002). However, it was established 
that for the elimination of US sanctions imposed 
on the EU to be definitive, this phase had to be 
fully implemented. The EU started a consultation 
process in July 2002 aiming to define the new 
regime, but it was not until January 2006 that a 
new import policy was implemented.
The disputed regime was substituted by a 
tariff-only import system under which protected 
and non-preferred exporters compete solely on 
the basis of tariff differences. Quotas on Latin 
American bananas were eliminated and imports 
from this region are taxed at €176 t-1 (Recall, 
the previous regime had a tariff of €75 t-1 with 
a quota). ACP imports are allowed duty free up 
to a quota level of 775 000 t, but ACP imports 
exceeding this amount must pay the same €176 t-1 
as the dollar bananas. 
Defining a tariff level was a long process 
for the EU and it involved 2 disputes brought to 
the WTO by Latin American nations. The initial 
requirement imposed by the WTO on the EU was 
that the tariff level had to ensure Latin American 
suppliers at least the same market access they 
had enjoyed under the previous import regime. In 
January 2005, the EU announced that after several 
months of consultation with ACP countries, they 
had defined a tariff level of €230 t-1 to imports 
from non-preferred suppliers. The ACP acquiesced 
to this tax believing it would let them compete 
against Latin American bananas. Considering 
this tariff level prohibitively high, a group of Latin 
American exporters requested arbitration with the 
WTO under the Doha Ministerial Decision. The 
arbitration panel determined the proposed tariff 
did not grant Latin American suppliers the same 
market-access they had previously enjoyed. 
Afterwards, the EU proposed a lower tariff 
of €187 t-1, which still did not please non-preferred 
suppliers. On this occasion, the EU requested a 
second arbitration to determine whether this new 
tax level was satisfactory. However, the report 
made by the WTO ruled out this tariff level on the 
grounds that it still did not provide Latin American 
access to the EU banana market. Finally, the EU 
set a tariff of €176 t-1 to imports from this region 
and that is the level that exists today. 
EqUIVALENCE OF THE TARIFF-ONLY 
AND THE PRE-2006 IMPORT REgIMES
Since the WTO required the EU to set its 
new tariff at a level that would maintain market 
access to its market, several authors have analyzed 
the feasibility of this task by trying to calculate a 
tariff equivalent to the tariff-quota system of the 
old regime. Others have analyzed the possible 
effects that alternative tariff levels would have 
on the main producers. Due to differences in 
modeling approaches, market parameters used 
and in the interpretation of what “maintaining 
market access” means, quite diverse results have 
emerged among the different studies. However, 
there is a common factor among most of these 
studies. This is that maintaining the pre-2006 
market structure is almost impossible by just 
using a tariff restriction. 
Guyomard and Le Mouël (2002) for 
example, calculated that a tariff of about €182 
t-1 would maintain 2005 market structure. But 
the author warns readers that this result is highly 
sensitive to model parameterization and modeling 
assumptions. Furthermore, this tariff level would 
only maintain market share in 2006. The level 
of this import tax must increase in subsequent 
years for ACP countries to maintain their 2005 
market share given productivity changes in Latin 
American banana production. 
Arias et al. (2006) used a partial equilibrium 
model to test various market scenarios and their 
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corresponding tariff equivalence. The authors 
concluded that the EU had to use several policy 
instruments if its objective was to simultaneously 
achieve all policy objectives attained with the 
CMOB import policy. That is, a single tariff 
level is not enough to maintain the pre-2006 
market structure. 
Arce et al. (2004) also tried to determine 
the minimum tariff level that would sustain the 
pre-2006 market equilibrium. Their estimations 
indicate that the EU must impose a tariff level of 
€259.8 t-1 for equilibrium prices and trade flows 
to stay as in 2004. The authors estimated that 
setting the tariff level at €75, as requested by Latin 
America, would increase imports from this area by 
7% and reduce its corresponding prices by 8.5% 
Finally, Anania (2006) estimated that 
the current tariff level of €176 t-1, benefits non-
preferred suppliers. Results show that exports 
of these countries will increase by 400 000 t 
in 2007 and further in subsequent years. The 
author estimated that the tariff level proposed 
by the EU in the second arbitration would have 
maintained at least the same market access to 
non-preferred exporters. 
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was to provide 
a brief but detailed history of the so-called 
“banana war”. The article summarizes the main 
events that have characterized the conflict among 
the European Union, Latin American countries, 
African, Caribbean and Pacific nations and the 
United States regarding banana imports into the 
European Union.  Disseminating the work of 
various sources, our goals were to provide in a 
single article i) the relevant details and histories 
of the myriad trade disputes; ii) a succinct 
discussion of the diverse and complicated tariff 
and quota regimes for banana imports that 
have existed in the last decade and how the 
came about, and iii) explain how the banana 
export market has been shaped by these forces. 
Hopefully we have provided the interested reader 
with a concise synopsis of how the newest import 
system adopted by the EU in January of 2006 
came about and what the current research has 
to say with regard to the economic cost of the 
previous import regimes and, finally, whether 
this new system is an improvement or not. 
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